Ethical guidelines for nudging in information security &amp; privacy by Renaud, Karen & Zimmermann, Verena
Accepted Manuscript
Ethical Guidelines for Nudging in Information 
Security & Privacy
Karen Renaud
Verena Zimmermann
PII: S1071-5819(18)30278-7
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijhcs.2018.05.011
Reference: YIJHC 2216
To appear in: International Journal of Human-Computer Studies
Received date: 7 January 2018
Revised date: 18 May 2018
Accepted date: 25 May 2018
Please cite this article as: Karen Renaud, Verena Zimmermann, Ethical Guidelines for Nudging
in Information Security & Privacy, International Journal of Human-Computer Studies (2018), doi:
10.1016/j.ijhcs.2018.05.011
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service
to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo
copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please
note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and
all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
This accepted manuscript is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Highlights
• Delineation of the nudge concept from the literature
• Synopsis of arguments for and against nudging
• Principles for ethical nudging in information privacy and security
• Demonstration of how the principles can be applied to empirical studies
• A helpful set of guidelines for Ethical Review Boards
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Ethical Guidelines for Nudging in
Information Security & Privacy
Karen Renaud & Verena Zimmermann
University of Abertay & Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt
Abstract
There has recently been an upsurge of interest in the deployment of behavioural
economics techniques in the information security and privacy domain. In this
paper, we consider first the nature of one particular intervention, the nudge,
and the way it exercises its influence. We contemplate the ethical ramifications
of nudging, in its broadest sense, deriving general principles for ethical nudg-
ing from the literature. We extrapolate these principles to the deployment of
nudging in information security and privacy. We explain how researchers can
use these guidelines to ensure that they satisfy the ethical requirements during
nudge trials in information security and privacy. Our guidelines also provide
guidance to ethics review boards that are required to evaluate nudge-related
research.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier May 2018
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1. Introduction
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein published a book titled ‘Nudge’ in 2008
[1], which introduced the world outside academia to behavioural economics.
They presented readers with the concept of nudging, i.e. small manipulations
to the context within which a decision is made. This context is referred to as
the ‘choice architecture’. Thaler and Sunstein provided examples of a variety
of such manipulations that were successful in mediating behavioural change in
practice. Nudging has been applied in a variety of contexts (e.g. health [2],
smoking [3] and obesity [4]). Digital nudging [5] is of particular interest in this
paper, in the context of information security and privacy (Info-S&P).
At least three governments (UK, USA and NSW in Australia) embraced the
concept, establishing units to explore how these techniques could be used in
order to ‘nudge’ citizens towards wiser behaviours [6, 7, 8].
Despite widespread acclaim [9, 10, 11], enthusiasm for nudges has not been
unanimous [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Sceptics, both in and out of academia, soon
questioned the ethics of nudging, especially when used by governments [12].
Many have expressed concerns, specifically with respect to the impact of nudges
on nudgees’ welfare, autonomy and dignity [17].
Information security and privacy researchers have started to trial nudges
to see whether they could be effective in persuading people to behave more
securely, or to act to preserve their privacy [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24].
As the nudge becomes the topic of more experiments, and is deployed across
public life, its ethical ramifications should be contemplated. Researchers wish-
ing to experiment with the behavioural change efficacy of specific nudges need
guidance about how to conduct such experiments in an ethical manner. As
Info-S&P researchers ourselves, we focus on the ethics of nudging in Info-S&P .
Before we can formulate nudge-specific ethical guidelines, we need first to
outline authoritative ethical principles. We then delineate the nudge concept
and present arguments for, and against, the deployment of nudges. Afterwards,
we derive a set of guidelines to inform ethical nudging in Info-S&P. We conclude
by showing how these guidelines can be applied.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. A delineation of the nudge concept, positioning it within a range of be-
havioural interventions.
2. A synthesis of arguments for and against nudging, and a mapping of these
to core ethical research principles.
3. A list of ethical nudge-specific guidelines to inform researchers wanting to
carry out ethical nudge-related studies.
4. Guidance for ethical review boards who need to evaluate Info-S&P nudge-
related proposals.
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2. Existing Ethical Guidelines
Nudge-related research has spread from being the purview of economists to a
variety of other fields. As such, its ethics ought to be considered from a number
of perspectives, addressing the concerns of those who adjudge ethical behavior
in these fields. Even in light of the relative newness of nudge techniques it is
time to formulate ethical guidelines to assist researchers aiming to deploy nudges
in the Info-S&P context. We commence by considering the existing guidelines
that cover human-related experimentation. Similar to McMillan et al. [25]
we mainly rely on ethical guidelines developed for psychological research, as
opposed to purely medical research due to a higher overlap with the research
questions addressed here.
The British Psychological Society (BPS) [26], the American Psychologi-
cal Association (APA) [27] and the Belmont report [28], that was created by
the American National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioural Research in 1978, provide widely-used guidelines,
which we will use to ground our discussion of the ethical principles related to
human-related research.
Table 1 lists the principles of the different organizations that are integrated
and explained below.
P1. Respect for Persons: Ethical research acknowledges the worth of all
people and respects differences between people, including, e.g., cultural
and individual differences such as age, gender, race national origin, reli-
gion, disability or language. Unfair, prejudiced or discriminatory practice
is avoided. Researchers ensure that the data of participants is appropri-
ately anonymized to protect their privacy and avoid long-term (perceived)
impairment of participant’s autonomy.
P2. Beneficence: The aim of research is to maximize the benefit of their work
and to contribute to the “common good”. Furthermore, participants and
other groups involved in or affected by the research should be protected
from harm and potential risks.
P3. Justice: All people should equally be entitled to access and benefit from
the research. Justice also requires burdens not to be unduly imposed.
P4. Scientific Integrity: “Research should be designed, reviewed and con-
ducted in a way that ensures its quality, integrity and contribution to the
development of knowledge and understanding” [26, p. 8]. Professional
scientific and scholarly standards should be adhered to.
P5. Social Responsibility: Researchers “acknowledge the evolution of social
structures in relation to societal need and be respectful of such structures”
[26, p. 10]. Researchers should be aware of expected as well as unexpected
outcomes of research and their possible consequences.
Having laid down the ethical principles, we now delineate the nudge concept.
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3. Introducing Nudging
A nudge implies a deliberate attempt to influence human behaviour, usually
by manipulating the choice architecture [29], and is deployed in a situation
where a person needs to make a choice between at least two options. The nudge
aims to influence people to choose the option considered better, or wiser, by the
nudge designer.
It is important, in discussing the deployment of nudges, that we have a clear
understanding of what a nudge actually is. Without this clarity, we cannot hope
to formulate ethical guidelines for experimental trials.
3.1. Original Nudge Definition
Nudging is defined by its creators, Thaler and Sunstein [1, p. 6], as:
“Any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior
in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly
changing their economic incentives”
The idea behind the concept of the nudge is that the nudge designer carefully
architects the choice architecture in such a way that the better option becomes
more convenient or salient, making it more likely that the nudgee will make the
wiser choice [30].
Although not captured in this definition, the strong message throughout
Thaler and Sunstein’s book is that nudging ought to be carried out for the
good of the nudgee. Hansen and Jespersen [29] report that Thaler signs each
copy of their book, Nudge, with the words “Nudge for good”. Hence there is
an implicit requirement for nudgers to ensure that the choice they are nudging
people towards is actually beneficial as judged by the nudgees themselves.
A nudge thus has the following characteristics [1]:
• Retention of all pre-nudge options: the original set of choices should
still be available.
• Economic incentives should be untouched: which means that simply
rewarding one choice, or punishing another, does not constitute a nudge.
• It is possible to predict the option that nudgees will choose: the
choice architecture is designed to make it more likely that the nudgee will
choose the better option. Hence the intervention is specifically tailored to
lead to that outcome.
• Beneficial: nudges should be designed to maximize the good of the
nudgee, as judged by the nudgee him or herself.
When one subjects the examples that Thaler and Sunstein provide in their
book to the requirements of this definition, a certain fuzziness of the concept
emerges, as highlighted by Lin et al. [31].
5
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
In the first place, some of their examples involve bans, which breaks the
‘retention’ requirement [31].
Secondly, some of their examples emphasize the attractiveness of the ‘wiser’
choice by using financial incentives, which does not meet the ‘equivalence’ re-
quirement [32]. An example is paying teenagers a dollar a day not to fall preg-
nant [1]. It seems that Sunstein detected this apparent contradiction, because
in his later book [17] he suggests that nudges ought not to impose significant
material incentives [33]. Nys and Engelen [9] make the same recommendation,
arguing that weighting one option or penalising another contradicts the spirit
of the nudge.
Finally, the fourth requirement is for nudges to influence people “for good”.
The obvious question is, “whose good?”, which is where the ethical concerns
come into play. The implicit assumption is that they are for the good of the
nudgee, but they could also be intended to benefit someone other than the
nudgee him or herself [34].
Hagmann et al. [35] suggests a distinction between pro-self and pro-social
nudges. The first type aims to maximize individual welfare, the latter influences
behavior in order to promote the public good. Other writers have referred to
the latter as a ‘Social Nudge’ [36, 37]. An example of a pro-self nudge would be
one that attempts to reduce tobacco consumption [38]. The “Don’t mess with
Texas” anti-littering campaign is an example of a pro-social nudge [1].
A pro-social nudge might not always be considered beneficial by the nudgee
him or herself. For example, in many countries parents are encouraged to permit
their children to be given a flu vaccine. The idea is to create a herd immunity
[39], thereby primarily benefiting the older members of society. A nudge towards
this vaccine is clearly pro-social, but many anti-vaccine parents [40] might not
consider the vaccination option to be the “good” one for the vaccine recipient,
and might well consider the nudge to be con-self.
It has to be acknowledged that nudging, like any useful tool, can also be
used ‘for evil’. Thaler recently coined the term ‘sludge’ to refer to nudges that
are deployed for less wholesome ends than originally intended [41].
Even if we avoid these kinds of controversial contexts, Tocchetto [42] argues
that it is somewhat simplistic to consider a universally-applied nudge beneficial,
given the wide range of possible preferences held by nudgees, and the impossibil-
ity of a nudger judging goodness on behalf of a heterogeneous group of nudgees.
The same argument is made by Knijnenburg [43].
We have shown that at least three components of Thaler and Sunstein’s
nudge definition create difficulties. Other researchers have proposed revised
definitions to make the concept more clear-cut [44, 45, 46]. Hansen [33] dedicates
an entire paper to coming up with a better definition.
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3.2. Hansen’s Definition
In 2015, Hansen proposed a new definition, in order to distance nudges,
as a technique, from libertarian paternalism1. As a concept, it has become
intertwined with nudges since Thaler and Sunstein’s book was first published
[1]. Hansen [33, p. 16] advances the following definition for nudging:
“A nudge is a function of (1) any attempt at influencing people’s
judgement, choice or behavior in a predictable way, that is (2) made
possible because of cognitive boundaries, biases, routines and habits
in individual and social decision-making posing barriers for people
to perform rationally in their own self-declared interests and which
(3) works by making use of those boundaries, biases, routines and
habits as integral parts of such attempts”
This definition suggests the following characteristics of nudges, that they:
• Produce Predictable Outcomes: deliver their influence in a predictable
direction,
• Combat Irrationality: intervene where people do not perform rationally
in their own self interests due to their cognitive boundaries, biases, routines
and habits, and
• Exploit Irrationality: exploit people’s cognitive boundaries, biases, rou-
tines and habits in order to influence their behavior for the better.
This definition is clearer, and does indeed get closer to extricating nudging
from the tricky domain of libertarian paternalism. Most importantly, it removes
the subjective “for good” requirement. It also does not require equivalence or
retention of all choice options, as does the original definition.
3.3. Summary
In addition to Hansen’s, and the original definition, a number of other re-
searchers have sought to demarcate the nature of the nudge more effectively
[47, 48, 45]. Such a range of definitions, each slightly different, suggests that
there might well be many different kinds of behavioural interventions, all being
called nudges.
Trying to encapsulate every possible behavioural intervention within the
scope of one definition might well be unrealistic. Moreover, this definition,
probably deliberately, does not attempt to incorporate any suggestion of ethics.
Those who coined the term ‘nudge’ made a strong point that nudging ought to
be carried out for good. Such an umbrella term cannot hope sufficiently to en-
capsulate the ethics of nudge interventions because it is essentially subjectively
1This term refers to the idea that those in authority influence people to take the “right”
course of action. They do not constrain or coerce, under the rationale that people, having
chosen, are fully responsible for the consequences of their choices.
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determined by the nudge designer. Ethical guidelines exist to protect the rights
of nudgees, and definitions, per se, are probably not the right place to capture
ethical considerations.
The following section explores a proposed nomenclature for different be-
havioural interventions, seeking better to situate the nudge concept within a
general framework of behavioural interventions. Moreover, this helps us to
identify the distinct ethical nuances and concerns of each different intervention
type.
4. Positioning the Nudge
We commence our discussion by considering the means by which nudges
influence nudgees. This helps us to reason about the differences and similarities
of behavioural intervention techniques, and to position nudges within the range
of such interventions.
4.1. How Do Nudges Influence?
One way of examining the way nudges influence is to use the dual-system
framework [49, 50]. System 1 refers to the automatic and quick way of processing
and System 2 the reflective and more time-consuming kind of thinking [29].
Michalek et al. [51] argue that there are Type 1 and Type 2 nudges, mapping
onto the two types of human information processing.
Along these lines, Type 1 nudges would influence the System 1 processing
system, exploiting predictable cognitive biases and heuristics in order to influ-
ence people towards wiser actions [9, 33, 45]. Type 2 nudges would target the
more reflective part of the brain, relying on rational consideration and deliberate
behavioural change.
Gru¨ne-Yanoff and Hertwig [52] argue that System 1 targeting is at the heart
of the successful nudge. Indeed, Hansen’s definition [33] incorporates the ex-
ploitation of the same System 1 biases in order to lead people towards wiser
behaviours, supporting the idea that nudges should attempt to target System 1
processing.
Underlying these classifications as either System 1 or 2 processing is the
assumption that it is indeed possible to target only one of these systems i.e. that
the systems are separate and independent. Some researchers have questioned
this dichotomy, asking whether one can actually target only one of the two with
a particular intervention. Lin et al. [30] cite research that shows that some claim
serial operation of the systems, others parallel, and yet others that they interact
to inform behaviours. Lin et al. argue that the parallel constraint satisfaction
(PCS) model proposed by [53] serves as a better approximation of the way the
two systems interconnect and cooperate to lead to a decision outcome.
If we acknowledge the interdependent nature of the dual-system processing
systems, it seems na¨ıve to argue that nudges could be tailored to target one
processing system or another independently. Lin et al. [30, p. 565] suggest a
more realistic distinction, as follows:
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Targeting Automatic Processing nudges are those that “minimally dis-
rupt the choice context to prompt some adjustment in the way the in-
formation within it is processed at the point of decision”.
Targeting Reflective Processing nudges aim to “‘promote a sustained re-
evaluation of the evidence base upon which people make their choices, and
the choices themselves, by disrupting the coherence between the two”.
While these distinctions incorporate the nature of dual processing, they focus
on the essence of the nudge design itself, and this is important when we consider
their ethics.
4.2. Nudge Types
Calo [54], instead of providing a definition of a nudge, situates the nudge
mechanism within three categories of behavioural interventions.
• The first, code, involves a manipulation of the environment that makes
the undesirable behavior difficult. An example is that of speed bumps.
• The second, called the nudge, exploits human bias to influence people
towards wiser behaviours.
• The third, notice, is essentially the provision of information. Other
researchers agree that information provision is different from nudging
[55, 31, 56]. The argument for notices not being nudges is that if we
consider information provision to be nudging, this makes just about any-
thing a nudge. Such a broad definition of nudge, as Osman points out
[31], is problematical because it renders the nudge program unfalsifiable.
Moreover, as Mongin and Cozic [56] and Hansen [33] ask: “if information
provision is a nudge, then what is new about the nudging concept?”
This categorisation narrows the concept of a nudge appreciably. Mere infor-
mation provision, such as reminders, are termed notices, not nudges. Moreover,
Calo also separates the idea of constraining environmental manipulations from
nudges, terming these codes. Hansen’s definition [33] clearly aligns with Calo’s
characterisation of a nudge.
Saghai [45] introduces the concept of a prod. He says the prod is much more
controlling than the nudge, which gently increases the likelihood of someone
making the wiser choice. Saghai [57] explains that the prod is much harder to
resist than the nudge.
We can now flesh out the different behavioural interventions.
→ Code: Codes make use of an environmental manipulation to make un-
favorable behavior more difficult, as compared to the favorable option, or even
near to impossible. An example here is a system that attempts to make the
choice of an insecure password more difficult by blacklisting known weak pass-
words such as ‘123456’ and ‘password’. The person choosing a new password
is no longer able to choose known weak passwords but can still choose weak
passwords that do not appear on the blacklist. This is a code because it puts
9
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barriers in the way of known weak passwords. Another example of a code is the
Windows update prompt. The device owner only has two choices: do it now, or
do it later. There is no chance of turning down the update altogether.
The ethical concerns here relate to the justification for applying a code. One
weak password is all that is required for a hacker to compromise an entire system,
so the nudger could argue that a constraining code does not constitute a lack of
respect, in terms of ethics, because the benefit, in this case, accrues to society
as a whole. If the code makes things unduly difficult for the nudgee, especially
if it is accompanied by some kind of sanction, it could be considered to violate
the ethical principle of justice despite the argued benefit to society as a whole.
→ Simple Nudge: This is the nudge encapsulated by Hansen’s definition.
It aims to target and benefit from well-known cognitive boundaries, such as bi-
ases, that are often processed subconsciously. Yet the behavioural change may
be short-lived because nudgees do not engage in the decision on any substantial
level [30, 42]. Nudgees may not even be aware of being nudged and so cannot
consciously change behaviours outside of the influence of the nudge. For exam-
ple, a nudge that orders the display of available WiFi connections from most to
least secure might not be noticed if the person is in the habit of choosing the first
available network to connect to. When they are using a different device without
the nudge they are likely to connect to an insecure network simply because it is
listed first. Because they were unaware of the nudge, and its influence, they do
not change their behavior in other contexts where the nudge is absent.
The ethical concern here is primarily respect, because the person is often
unaware of the nudge and therefore arguably has their behavior manipulated
by an unseen nudger for the nudger’s unknown purposes to achieve ends that
the nudgee might not approve of. Beneficence and Justice could be questionable
depending on the nudger’s rationale: If used for the nudger’s rather than the
nudgee’s benefit the nudge would be called a sludge [41].
→ Prod: Saghai [45] introduces an intervention, called a prod. He says
that, unlike nudges, prods are controlling, whereas nudges exert their influence
gently. The ‘prod’ Saghai is referring to would be harder to resist due to its
controlling nature.
Hukkinen [58] explains that prods, being controlling, do not permit the
nudgee to retain control over decisions, because they are largely irresistible.
An example of an unscrupulous prod would be a hacker planting a USB la-
belled “redundancies”. It would be very difficult for an employee to resist the
urge to plug it in and examine it.
In terms of ethics, the prod might more easily violate respect, depending
on how controlling it is because it influences people in a way that they are
not necessarily aware of, and there is no expectation of goodness being the
justification for the intervention, as is the case for the simple nudge. In the
hands of an unscrupulous nudger, prods can easily become unethical.
→ Notice: Notices provide information in order to make the nudgee reflect
on the decision and behave more wisely. The assumption is better decision-
making is possible if the nudgee have all the facts and thus aim to bridge the
gap of knowledge between the nudgee and a second party e.g. a provider. Many
10
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examples exist where information provision constitutes nudging [59, 60, 61, 62].
An example from our context is the kind of information provided by app stores
about the permissions that Smartphone apps will require or how the user’s
personal data is dealt with in terms of privacy. This information is provided,
but does not seem to put people off installing privacy-invasive apps, or those
asking for excessive permissions [63]. It is possible that people do not understand
the full implication of a notice provided in the Info S&P domain or that they
do not consider that it applies to they themselves [64].
Notices, on their own, are often ineffective in changing human behavior [65].
A good example is the choice of weak passwords in violation of password policies
[66, 67]. Notices, by neglecting to pay attention to, and harness, behavioural
biases, fail to benefit from their power. Their impact is also potentially neutral-
ized by the unanticipated activation of behavioural biases.
Notices are widely used in many walks of life. In experimentation, they do
not seem to have any ethical considerations, as long as they are not coercive or
accompanied by sanctions. In this case, a notice becomes a code, and does risk
violating respect and justice.
→ Hybrid Nudge: Some researchers have argued for a multi-pronged
rather than a single intervention to be deployed to change complex behaviours
[36, 68]. O¨lander and Thøgersen [65] argue that notices should be combined
with a nudge to achieve effective behavioural change. An example is the use
of an intervention that persuades people to choose stronger passwords. Renaud
and Zimmermann designed a hybrid nudge with three components, a simple
nudge, a notice and an incentive, which effectively led to stronger passwords in
a longitudinal study [69].
The hybrid nudge is a different kind of behavioural intervention, one that
does more than attempt to target and exploit people’s automated cognitive
processes to influence them. By combining a simple nudge with an intervention
targeting reflective reasoning (e.g. a notice), a more powerful intervention can
be crafted. Such an intervention is enriched by its hybrid nature. It targets
and benefits from well-known cognitive biases, but it also seeks to harness the
nudgee’s reflective system so that the person is more likely to become aware of
the changes in their behaviour, and is able to reflect and deliberately change
their behavior as a consequence, even in contexts where the nudge is not present.
In terms of ethics, the hybrid nudge attempts both to become more influ-
ential, and more ethical, than the other interventions. It harnesses the power
of the simple nudge by targeting and benefiting from automated cognitive pro-
cesses, but it offsets the lack of respect that the simple nudge could commit by
pairing it with an intervention that targets reflective reasoning. This pairing
means that the intervention does not seek to manipulate without the knowledge
and awareness of the targeted nudgee. By making the intervention transparent
to the nudgee, it demonstrates respect. The nudger still has to demonstrate
beneficence in order to be ethical.
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4.3. Nudge Dimensions
Considering the large number of interventions described above, the question
arises of which one to use. The ethical considerations, along with the presen-
tation of the interventions, should respect the nudgee by e.g. being transpar-
ent and not limiting choice. Apart from that, the context and purpose of the
intervention should be considered in order to design a successful and ethical
intervention. Nudges that are misaligned with the context of the targeted deci-
sion risk not only being unsuccessful but also being prone to unanticipated and
negative side effects that are further discussed in Section 6.
Two interrelated dimensions to decision-making contexts emerge from the
nudge literature.
The first dimension is the complexity of the decision that is being targeted.
Thaler and Sunstein’s definition reflects a simple choice between two or more
equivalent options, e.g. choosing between two equivalent anti-virus programmes.
Complex decisions, on the other hand, are multi-faceted with multiple influences
informing them. In this case, options are generally unequal, with the ‘wiser’ op-
tion often being far more expensive. An example here might be the choice
between different navigation apps with a different range of functions, cost and
privacy-infringing permission requests. While a simple nudge might be pow-
erful enough to influence a one-dimensional choice, it might not be sufficient
to overwhelm and neutralize other factors in a complex multi-factor decision
context.
The second dimension is related to whether the nudge is targeted to influ-
ence one-off or repeated behaviours. For example, the decision to buy a certain
Smartphone can be viewed as a one-off decision. A person buys a Smartphone
and keeps it for a few years before again making a similar decision. The decision
to connect to a public WiFi could be viewed as a repeated decision that might
even occur daily. A simple nudge presented only once might be effective in influ-
encing a WiFi-decision once. However, it is unlikely that a single presentation
that does not involve reflective reasoning will impact the repeated behavior in
the long-term.
A number of Info S&P nudges have proved ineffective [70, 71, 72, 73, 74,
75, 76, 77, 78]. These nudges might well have failed because they did not
acknowledge the complexity and frequency of human decisions, dual processing
and interconnectedness, and the need to match these to the choice of intervention
to deploy [79, 80, 81, 82].
4.4. Summary
This discussion concludes that behavioural interventions can fit into a num-
ber of different categories, target different forms of information processing, and
can be delivered once or repeatedly. To choose appropriate interventions, re-
searchers should consider certain context dimensions, such as the complexity of
the decision or the desired durability of the behavioural change.
Table 2 presents the differences between the concepts of a code, a notice, a
prod, a simple and a hybrid nudge. It shows how the interventions influence,
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how they are delivered, what cognitive processes they target and what ethical
concerns might be linked to their use.
Table 3 gives a flavor of research activity in the field of Info S&P, providing a
list of insecure behaviours gathered from the literature [83, 84, 85] and mapping
these to Info-S&P nudge examples2.
4.5. Moving Forward
Based on our classification of interventions, we will now limit our discussion
to the ethics of simple and hybrid nudges. We will not consider the other types
of interventions further for the following reasons:
Codes: According to the definition provided by Calo [54], codes can make
the undesirable behaviour not only difficult but also near to impossible, thereby
limiting the choices. This kind of intervention not only puts a burden on a
nudgee wishing to choose the “unwise” behaviour but limits the available choice
set, which does not align with our nudge definition.
Notices: Notices are purely educational interventions that target reflective
reasoning by providing information to the nudgee. This, too, falls outside the
definition of a nudge.
Prods: The concept of prods is similar to that of nudges. However, as prods
exert more control than simple nudges, they might more easily violate ethical
principles. In practice, they are often used by salesmen or marketers [45] where
the beneficence for the nudgee might not be the primary aim.
There are arguments for, and against, the use of nudges, both simple and
hybrid, and we present these in the following sections.
5. Arguments for Nudging
Nudge advocates make a number of arguments in favor of nudging.
Choice Architectures are Inescapable
Sunstein [17] explains that there is no such thing as a neutral choice archi-
tecture. Whatever the environment and context of the nudge is, he says, it will
influence the nudgee, and Acquisti et al. [83] make the same argument. For
example, every form of a password creation interface is a choice architecture, be
it designed deliberately or not. The text field is positioned in a certain way and
is a certain size, color might be used in a particular way and password creation
is often accompanied by some form of textual instruction or information, all
of which might influence the user’s chosen password. Greenfield argues that
the whole concept of humans having preferences that are unaffected by existing
framing is na¨ıve [86]. In a similar way, Brooks [87] also states that nudges are
inevitable. From his perspective, the question is not whether to nudge, but
how to do it in an ethical way. He argues for better mechanisms for obtaining
informed consent and for nudge transparency.
2It should be noted that some of these interventions were not labelled as “nudges” but
they do bear all the hallmarks of nudges so we included them.
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Nudging eases Choice
People have great difficulty in choosing if there are many options to choose
from, and many dimensions of difference between the options [88]. In this case, a
facilitating nudge may well be very helpful [89, 90] rather than being considered
an assault on personal autonomy. For example, choosing between, and evaluat-
ing, the privacy implications of Smartphone apps is not a trivial task. Nudges
that ease choice, perhaps by consolidating privacy implications and labeling
them with happy or sad smileys might well be considered beneficial.
Autonomy Objections are Specious
The sticking point that most nudge researchers cannot agree on is the matter
of autonomy. Sunstein [17] denies that nudges unacceptably infringe autonomy
for two reasons. Firstly because, according to their definition, nudgees are free
to ignore the influence of the nudge and secondly because all the original choices
are retained and available to the nudgee.
Other researchers acknowledge that autonomy might well be infringed, but
argue that it is justified because nudges are intended “for good” [91]. Indeed,
Moher and El Emam [92] argue that nudges can help people to resist emotional
pulls and make the choice they would have made if they had reflected on their
decision.
Finally, others question whether autonomy preservation is really the uni-
versal good it is touted to be [93], and argue for context-dependent judgement
of such goodness. Gordijn and Ten Have [94] point out that autonomy has
not proved the “cure-all” for all ethical issues in society. This argument might
especially apply to social nudges that are intended for the greater good such
as defaults nudging users towards secure actions in order to make systems less
vulnerable to cyber attacks.
Nudges are Beneficial
DiSilvestro [95] claims that nudging is beneficial if one considers that not
doing so would leave people subject to more malign “nudges” already in place.
In line with that, Sunstein’s [17] argument for purposeful nudging “for good” is
that it serves to counteract less-than-ethical nudges deployed by industry and
commerce. For example, a commercial provider might nudge users towards the
own software solution even though a more secure one exists. He acknowledges
that nudges could be used for illicit purposes, and advocates for full trans-
parency and public scrutiny so that citizens are aware of the techniques used to
influence their decisions. John et al. [96] make the case for governments using
nudges by arguing that government ensures that citizens band together for col-
lective benefit. He then argues that supporting civic behavior is a government’s
responsibility and this makes the use of pro-social nudges acceptable.
John Stuart Mill argued that the only justification for government action,
perhaps by deploying nudges, is that others would be harmed if they did not
act [97]. This reminds us of the pro-self and pro-social distinction suggested
14
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
by Hagmann et al. [35], with deployment of the latter being justified for the
common good.
Sunstein [98] concludes his paper with the following statement: “If we really
care about welfare, autonomy and dignity, nudging is often required on ethical
grounds. We need a lot more of it. The lives we save may be our own”
Summary
To summarize, the advocates of nudging believe that choice architectures are
inescapable because they pervade daily life. Moreover, such choice architectures
are never completely neutral. Nudge proponents argue for nudging to be used
in an ethical and beneficial way that may also facilitate complex individual
decision making.
6. Arguments against Nudging
Similar to the supporting arguments we structured the arguments against
nudging into a number of categories, to explore what we could perhaps call the
“dark side” of nudging.
Nudges disrespect Human Dignity
Some nudge opponents object on the grounds that they compromise human
dignity by not granting people autonomy [99, 100]. Wright [101] argues that
techniques, such as nudging, harm liberty and do not increase welfare.
There are two arguments against nudging in this category. The first being
that people should not be used as a means to an end [102]. Kant believes that
when people are treated as “means” it reduces their worth as human beings.
The second argument is that nudges, especially those targeting bias and
heuristics, influence behavior without the nudgee necessarily being aware of
their influence and without their having reflected upon their choice. Many thus
object to nudges deceitfully exploiting well-known human biases and “thwart-
ing” decisional capabilities to achieve their aims [103, 104].
Transparency & Opacity
When one reads the literature on nudging one concept that very quickly
comes to the fore is that of the transparency or opacity of nudges [9, 15, 105, 106].
Nys and Engelen [9] argue for transparency of nudges as a pre-requisite for
their ethical deployment. Similar to DiSilvestro [95] they argue that people
should be aware of the presence of the nudge. Indeed, Thaler and Sunstein [1]
explain that adherence to Rawls’ Publicity principle [107], i.e. full disclosure of
the presence of the nudge and willingness to defend its “goodness”, is necessary
to make it ethically sound [108]. However, many of the nudges used in society
do not satisfy this requirement. Simple nudges, those that target primarily the
automatic and subconscious processing system, will probably not be transparent
to the nudgee [29].
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Unrealistic Expectations
Researchers object to the underlying ethos of the nudge in that it appears
to offer a quick, easy and inexpensive solution to a complex problem [109, 110].
For example, Alberto and Salazar [109] warn that nudges towards healthy foods
induce short-term cosmetic changes in behaviours but that this conceals the
real causes of unhealthy eating. The apparent success might get in the way of
deeper investigations into real and lasting solutions to problems.
Mismatched Nudging
Brown [111] points out that people do not act purely in response to a par-
ticular choice architecture. He explains that people are also influenced by class,
gender and ethnicity and their own personal history. He also warns that people
differ in their responsiveness to, and willingness to be influenced by, nudges.
Nudgers who think they can design a one-size-fits-all nudge may well be
deluded because they do not acknowledge this reality. For example, some studies
focus on educational nudges, what Calo [54] calls notices. onnenberg et al.
[112] found that informative labels on foods helped people to make healthier
choices although in other domains a pure educational approach has not been
successful [113, 114]. Even where authors have merely posted a notice for people
to climb the stairs at a station, researchers report that environmental factors
such as busyness of the station and other environmental aspects, played a role in
making the intervention successful [115]. Furthermore, Sunstein [116] explains
that sometimes ‘counternudges’ exist that persuade people to respond to choice
architectures in a way that confounds the intended effect of the nudge.
These examples demonstrate the application of an intervention that does
not match the targeted group, context or behavior might not be successful or
even have unintended side effects that are worse than the original behaviour.
Unanticipated Side Effects
As described above, nudging might lead to unanticipated side effects. For
example, a nudge persuades someone to buy fruit, but that fruit then lies un-
eaten and is eventually put in the trash can. Other times it may even lead
to harmful side-effects. An example is the painting of fake potholes in roads
to persuade drivers to slow down [117]. Drivers might slow down until they
realize that the pot holes are actually fake. This might cause them to ignore
real potholes and damage their cars by not exercising care when driving over
them. Another example is the use of gory pictorial warnings on cigarette packs.
A trial of these showed that the pictures led to increased craving and anxiety
in heavy smokers [118], surely the opposite of what the nudgers intended.
Nudges are Paternalistic
The underlying paternalism of nudge-type interventions is particularly con-
cerning to many. Alberto and Salazar [109], for example, ask whether it is
acceptable to think that we know better than others what “healthy” means to
them personally. This argument could apply equally to individual perceptions
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of ‘security’. They also consider health nudging to be a metaphorical thin-end-
of-the-wedge. A successful nudge could lead nudgers to ever greater efforts and a
gradual erosion of individual agency and dignity. White [12] questions whether
it is at all possible for governments to know what is good for individuals on an
industrial scale and whether they have the right to manipulate people for their
own ends, once again invoking Kant’s warning about using people as means
[102].
Concerns about Choice Architects
Calo [54] raises the concern that the officials that generate the goals for nudg-
ing are themselves “flawed” in that they, too, succumb to bias and heuristics.
In line with that, Murray [119] and Scofield [14] ask how we can trust nudgers
and how people qualify to be choice architects.
Further, in an evolving world where new findings are continuously made and
new evidence accumulates, what is considered “good” by the choice architects
today might easily be considered ludicrous in a decade or two. For instance,
for many years saturated fat was demonised, and people were nudged away
from eating saturated fat e.g., by public health bodies in Western countries
[120]. Yet in the past few years evidence has emerged that this demonisation
was unfounded [121, 122]. The nudgers acted in good faith, but on the basis
of flawed or incomplete evidence [123]. Even so, they nudged, people changed
their eating habits, and the behavior people were nudged towards was not, in
retrospect, ‘better’.
Human Autonomy & Agency is Compromised
Wilkinson [124] claims that nudges are manipulative if people under the
influence of a nudge make a decision that they would not have made without
the nudge. Eyal [125] asks whether people can even be held responsible for
subconscious choices motivated by nudges.
The concepts of autonomy and agency suggest that people have the freedom
and right to make a choice that is aligned with their individual preferences.
Schubert [126] is concerned about the fact that nudges remove the need for
people to think about their preferences and decisions. He says this leads to
“excessive convenience”. Citing Korsgaard [127] he argues that the formulation
of preferences, and the freedom to do so, is an essential part of identity formation
and self-constitution. If a nudge removes the need for people to do this, do they
lose an essential part of that process and, by implication, their freedom of will?
When an individual is faced with a nudge, do they effectively outsource
their self-government and self-realization [128] to the nudger? This potential
surrendering of individual will, many believe, is a slippery slope that paves the
way to unethical widespread manipulation.
Summary
The opponents of nudging mainly offer the following arguments:
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First, nudges may compromise human autonomy and agency and thereby
also disrespect human dignity.
Second, nudge design is often mismatched with its purpose and thus subject
to unrealistic expectations and unanticipated side effects.
Third, nudges are developed by humans who also succumb to biases that
nudges target. The assumption that nudge developers know what is “good”
for the individual or the society at large is questionable given the complexity
of decision-making, global developments and new evidence. A warning note, in
this respect, is encapsulated in the quote by Japanese historical novelist Eliji
Yoshikawa: “There’s nothing more frightening than a half-baked do-gooder who
knows nothing of the world but takes it upon himself to tell the world what’s
good for it.”
Finally, opponents of nudging raise the concern that not every nudger’s
intention is “for good” but that nudges may rather be deployed “for profit”.
There is some evidence for sharp and misguided practice by those who claim
to have our best interests at heart [129, 130] which makes people mistrust and
question the benevolence of nudge-like behavioural interventions.
Table 4 shows how the arguments against nudging align with infringements
of ethical guidelines.
7. Ethical Info-S&P Nudging
Nudges in Info-S&P have mainly been tested and deployed in two areas:
(1) Privacy Preservation: Increasing awareness and promoting informed
decision-making in terms of privacy, e.g. nudging people towards installing
Smartphone applications that require minimal access to personal data.
[20, 21].
(2) Improving Security: e.g. by encouraging users to choose stronger pass-
words [131, 132, 74, 23].
Now that we have a clear understanding of a simple and a hybrid nudge, and
have a context to situate our discussion, we can contemplate the ethical princi-
ples of deploying Simple and Hybrid Nudges in the context of Info-S&P.
P1. Respect
Retention
End users must still be able to choose to ignore the option the nudge pushes
them towards. For example, if the nudge is a password strength meter, they
ought to be free to resist the influence of an intervention pushing them towards
stronger passwords. It might be necessary to mandate a particular minimum
password strength, and then conceivably use a nudge to encourage passwords
that exceed the minimum. However, the weaker options should still be available
so that the intervention respects their autonomy.
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If a nudge is attempting to persuade people to install less privacy-invasive
apps, they should still be free to install whichever apps they want to.
Generally speaking, no option should be banned or removed from he envi-
ronment. If a restriction of options is still considered necessary there should be
a reasonable explanation that should also be available for the nudgee. Exam-
ples might include law constraints or the requirement of a minimum password
strength to maintain a certain security level within an organisation.
Transparency
Scofield [14] echoes Sunstein’s requirements for nudges to be transparent
and visible to nudgees, in order to prevent abuse by choice architects using
subliminal mechanisms to influence people. Nys and Engelen [9] also argue for
transparency of nudges as a pre-requisite for their ethical deployment. People
should be aware of the presence of the nudge and the influence it is attempting
to exert. Referring to the two systems that nudges may target, this requirement
may be more easily met when either choosing a nudge that targets reflective
processing, or when using a combination of interventions, a hybrid nudge, that
includes interventions such as notices.
Meeting this requirement might be more difficult when a simple nudge is
deployed that targets automatic processing that nudgees might not be aware of.
It would then be necessary to provide sound arguments for the choice and to
undertake measures that increase the transparency of the nudge or at least to
debrief the nudgees. Knijnenburg [43] provides an example where a justification
for requiring information disclosure essentially increases distrust and has the
opposite effect on nudgees than what was intended. In such a case there would
be an asrgument for not making the nudge transparent to nudgees. However,
to meet ethical requirements the participants would have to be debriefed at the
end of the experiment, to meet the Respect requirement.
For instance, the display of a password strength meter meets this require-
ment, as does the enriched nudge tested by [69]. However, one could imagine
someone using a scary background on the web page subliminally to induce a fear
of hacking and thereby attempting to nudge people towards stronger passwords.
Apart from possible negative side effects such as people refraining from using
the website, such a nudge would not be transparent and therefore questionable
as far as ethics is concerned. The combination with a notice, e.g. a message
stating “Are you afraid of hackers? Feel more secure by choosing a strong pass-
word.” and feedback on password strength, perhaps by gradually making the
background less scary would increase the transparency of the nudge. However,
the kind of intervention would then no longer be a simple but rather a hybrid
nudge.
Ethical Checklist Questions
X P1(a). Are all original choices still available? If not, has the withdrawal
of some of the options been well-argued?
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X P1(b). Will nudgees be aware that an experiment is under way? If not, is
the need for this level of deception justified?
X P1(c). Will nudgees be aware of the nudge? If not, has the use of a simple
nudge been well argued and motivated?
X P1(d). Will participants be informed about the research beforehand (in-
formed consent)? If not, how will participants be debriefed?
P2. Beneficence Nudging should only be deployed when the benefit is clear
and the intervention is justified. Indeed, Thaler and Sunstein [1] talk about the
nudger having to be willing to defend its “goodness” to make it ethically sound
[108]. Without a defendable justification of its use, any deployment of a nudge
opens nudgees to accusations of unwarranted interference and to misuse by
nudgers who do not intend the good of the nudgee [56].
As discussed earlier, nudges can be classified as pro-self, pro-social or pro-
other. Researchers should consider who benefits from the nudge and also im-
plement measures to confirm the assumed benefit for the targeted group.
It must be trivial for nudgees to contact those deploying the nudge should
they have any questions or concerns. This is in line with Rawl’s Publicity
principle [107] and requires nudgers to have thought about the behavioural
biases they are attempting to ameliorate with the nudge.
Ethical Checklist Questions
X P2(a). Is the argument for a benefit of applying the nudge well argued, ei-
ther to the nudgee or to society at large? In particular, have the proposers
shown that their nudge is not actually a prod or sludge?
X P2(b). Will nudgees be able to contact the choice architect if they have
questions or concerns? If yes, is there a commitment to respond to ques-
tions within a certain period of time? If not, is there an explanation for
this?
X P2(c). Has the benefit for the targeted group already been evaluated and
reported in the research literature? If not, how will the assumed benefit
be evaluated?
P3. Justice
As many people as possible should be able to benefit equally from the re-
search and have access to the results and/or the intervention. Thus, researchers
should consider measures to facilitate easy access from different locations, in dif-
ferent languages or for people with certain disabilities. Instead of using text, one
could consider widely adopted color coding or symbols to deliver a certain warn-
ing message. Furthermore, to make interventions available to other researchers
or organizations, one could provide open-source software. Furthermore, neither
access to nor the intervention itself should be unjust or unnecessarily burden-
some. For instance, in terms of password authentication, designers should put
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some thought into applying a rule such as “require passwords to be as strong as
needed, as matched to the value of the asset, but no stronger”. Asking people
to strengthen passwords merely because “strong passwords are good” does not
meet this requirement. Moreover, if the options are unequal in terms of effort,
nudging towards the more effortful options has to be properly justified. Finally,
nudgers should ensure that the nudgees are apprised of the motivations for the
nudges.
Ethical Checklist Questions
X P3(a). Is it clear that all participants can benefit equally from the nudge?
X P3(b). Are the research results and/or the interventions accessible?
X P3(c). Have measures been undertaken to avoid unjust practice or unre-
alistic burdens?
P4. Scientific Integrity The choice architect must be able to provide
scientific reasoning for the assumed impact of the nudge [9] and be able to argue
that it is beneficial to the nudgee [1, 17], society [35] or a vulnerable other [133].
Furthermore, the researcher has to be accurate and honest about the reasoning
and the research findings. The study design, and also the nudge design, should
follow sound scientific practice, and appropriately match the aim of the research.
Nudge designers should therefore consider the nudge dimensions, e.g. is the
targeted decision simple or complex and is the research aimed at short-term or
long-term behaviour. These dimensions would influence whether a nudge should
be presented once or repeatedly. In case of doubt other researchers should be
asked for advice. For instance, [134] based the design of the tested password
generator on the decoy effect that has been proven successful in other areas of
research. The decoy effect states that adding a third, unfavorable option to two
existing options can influence the decision making process.
Ethical Checklist Questions
X P4(a). Is the impact of the nudge predictable, and based on evidence from
the research literature?
X P4(b). Does the chosen nudge (simple or hybrid) and the mode of delivery
(once or repeatedly) match the decision (complex or simple) and behavior
being targeted (short or long term)?
P5. Social Responsibility Researchers should always consider anticipated
as well as unanticipated consequences of their research and the targeted change
in the individual’s behavior for the individual and the society at large. It is
sometimes the case that a pro-social nudge is contemplated, in order to advance
the collective good. An example of this could be a nudge towards stronger
passwords. One weak password is often used to enter a system, after which the
hacker will access other users’ data as well. Yet, because of the costliness of
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more secure or privacy preserving options, it is essential for the situation to be
monitored carefully so that unintended side effects can be detected as soon as
possible [135]. It is essential for an intervention not to harm the community
while perhaps delivering the narrow outcome the nudger had in mind. For
instance, nudging people towards stronger passwords to create a kind of ”herd
immunity” against attacks from the outside might have the unintended side-
effect of increasing the risk of attacks from the inside as more people may write
passwords down and store them insecurely.
Ethical Checklist Questions
X P5(a). Have the possible consequences of the nudge on the individual
and society at large been considered? Have measures been undertaken
beforehand to avoid or decrease possible negative side effects?
X P5(b). Is there a reasonable plan for monitoring the effect of the nudge,
i.e. taking snapshots at regular intervals?
X P5(c). Is there a plan for discontinuing the nudge if unintended side effects
are detected?
X P5(d). Is there a proposal for monitoring long-term nudge impact if this
is applicable?
8. Applying the Guidelines
We do not intend to denigrate other researchers’ work or to judge their
research in terms of its ethical implications. For the purposes of this discussion,
our stance is that interventions published by researchers in the field have been
trialled to improve Info-S&P, not for nefarious purposes. However, we hope
to increase awareness of, and stimulate discussion about, ethical guidelines to
inform experimentation with different nudges. Examples covering different areas
of Info-S&P research will be discussed, along with the ethical implications based
on the guidelines presented in Section 7.
8.1. Security Nudges
In a security-related study Jeske et al. [18] successfully nudged users to-
wards using secure WiFi options by manipulating color and menu order on a
Smartphone interface. Yevseyeva et al. [19] confirmed this finding. Other re-
searchers tried to make use of password meters as a nudge to encourage more
secure password creation [131, 132, 74, 23]. While some trials were at least
partially successful, others were not. However, the mixed success of these trials
might also partially be due to the fuzzy concept of nudges discussed previously.
While Sunstein and Thaler classify feedback as a nudge [1], others do not con-
sider mere information provision a nudge [55, 31, 56, 33]. Renaud et al. [70]
tested the effect of eight visual password nudges on password security in the
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wild. Examples comprise a watching pair of eyes to invoke social norms, re-
placing “Choose a password” with “Choose a secret” to test the priming effect,
but also contrasting actual to suggested password strength using a dynamic
strength meter. The trials were not successful in changing user behaviour, and
the authors suggest some explanations for the non-effect, including the fact that
the nudgers were attempting to influence complex decisions with simple nudges
(See Section 4.3).
8.1.1. Simple vs. Hybrid Nudges
From the interventions described above, the watching pair of eyes used by
Renaud et al. [70] might be termed a simple nudge. It is targeted to exploit
a certain cognitive effect: the influence of social norms. Even if the user no-
tices the picture, he or she might not be aware of the intention or influence it
exerts. Furthermore, the picture does not encourage reasoning or consideration
of other information. In contrast, the intervention contrasting actual and sug-
gested password strength in [70] can be viewed as a hybrid nudge. The user
is informed (notice) about actual password strength whereas the contrast to
suggested password strength is targeted to nudge the user towards a stronger
password. Furthermore, the intervention aims to encourage reflection because
a complex decision is required: the user has to think about, and attempt to
improve, the strength of their password.
8.1.2. The Guidelines
We are not going to redo the ethics approval process here, just demonstrate
the application of the checklist items and highlight pertinent ethical aspects
that show up during the process. We will consider the watching eyes (simple
nudge) and password strength (hybrid nudge) described above.
In terms of P1, the participants were informed that an experiment would take
place (P1(b)) and completed an informed consent form (P1(d)). The partici-
pants could opt out of the study but still profit from the use of a web application
that the nudges were deployed on. They had the option to create a password
of any strength, and no restrictions were imposed (P1(a)). It is reasonable to
believe that the nudgees were aware of the intervention contrasting actual and
desired password strength, the hybrid nudge, and the influence it was supposed
to exert (P1(c)). Concerning the watching pair of eyes, the simple nudge, this
is harder to determine. The participants probably noticed the picture but its
intention was perhaps unclear (P1(c)).
The benefit of this research (P2) was to explore ways to increase password
strength and thereby security of the associated accounts (P2(a)). The nudges
were based on cognitive effects that have been proven successful in other areas
of research e.g., the influence of social norms or the priming effect (P2(c)). The
assumed benefit was measured by password strength and password length of the
nudgees’ passwords. The nudgees were provided with the researchers’ contact
details so that they could voice concerns or ask questions (P2(b)).
Concerning P3, it was ensured that all computer science students were able
to benefit from the functionality offered by the web application independently of
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their participation in the experiment (P3(a) and P3(c)). The results of the re-
search were published, including a description of the nudges, to facilitate access
by the broader research community (P3(b)).
As stated above, the nudges were based on scientific principles and effects
shown in the literature (P4(a)). They were developed by a group of researchers
that provided feedback and were deployed after the consultation of an Ethics
Review Board. To target long-term behaviour, the nudges were shown whenever
a new password was created (P4(b)).
In terms of P5, password length and strength were measured to detect effects
of the nudge. Other measures such as user self-reports, were not collected to
minimize effort, but could have been a valuable addition to detect further side
effects (P5(b)).
If negative effects on password strength were observed, the nudge could have
been removed from the web application easily without compromising its func-
tionality. Furthermore, the duration of the experiment, and thus the deployment
of the nudge, was limited to the duration of one academic year (P5(a) & P5(c)).
Still, even though the nudges targeted long-term behaviour, the assumed
long term change or the transfer to other contexts was not measured due to the
exploratory nature of the research (P5(d)). Future studies could benefit from
adding these measures.
8.2. Privacy Nudges
Examples of privacy-related nudge research comprise trials that aim to in-
crease the users’ awareness of privacy-invasive mobile apps. For instance, in an
app study Almuhimedi et al. [136] analysed the effects of two complementary
approaches, a permission manager in conjunction with privacy notifications, on
privacy awareness. They found that after a period of one week 95% of partic-
ipants reassessed their apps’ permissions, and 58% of them further restricted
them.
Based on the framing effect, Choe et al. [20] developed a visual rating of an
mobile app’s privacy to nudge people away from privacy-invasive mobile apps.
Indeed, the visual rating influenced the participants’ perceptions of the mobile
app’s privacy even though the influence of the framing was subtle and only
applicable for low privacy rating apps.
8.2.1. Simple vs. Hybrid Nudges
In the study carried out by Choe et al. [20], the intervention consisted
of a visual representation of a mobile phone app’s level of privacy framed in
a positive or negative way. In the first part of the study complementary icons
that conveyed semantically equivalent information were evaluated. In the second
part the influence of these symbols on participants’ app decisions was analyzed.
The positively-framed visuals comprised between one and five green-colored
plus signs, the negatively framed ones red-colored minus signs. The number
of signs was chosen in relation to the app’s privacy level similar to a movie or
product rating. The manipulation of the privacy ratings in the second part of
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the study can be regarded as a simple nudge, as it was based on the cognitive
“framing effect”, that is people’s decisions partly depend on the way problems
are presented, i.e. framed. Furthermore, the effect exerts its influence without
people being aware that they are affected by it, thus subconsciously.
8.2.2. The Guidelines
Again, we do not aim to redo the ethics approval process, but rather to high-
light interesting aspects when applying the checklist items to the experiment.
We will consider the simple nudge described above based on the information
provided in the publication. It is clear that checklist items P1(a), P1(b) and
P1(d) were satisfied as participants were recruited using Mechanical Turk and
thus knew they were participating in an experiment. Furthermore, the set of
options was not restricted by adding visual icons. Similar to the study described
in the security section, people were probably aware of the icons and their mean-
ing, but perhaps not of the effect they were supposed to exert. However, the
participants were asked questions concerning the icons after measuring their
effect, and this was likely to trigger reflection thus largely fulfilling P1(c).
In reviewing this application, review boards were probably convinced of the
goodness of the nudge (P2(d)) and its aim to “explore novel ways to nudge
people away from privacy-invasive apps when they search for and compare apps
to install”. It is also reasonable to believe that participants could contact the
researchers as the study was conducted using a well-established survey platform
(P2(b)). Furthermore, the assumed benefit of the nudge was measured by the
participants’ perceptions, such as likeability, and willingness to install the app
(P2(c)).
The research results and the intervention have been made available via the
publication satisfying checklist item P3(b). The participants were compensated
for their participation with a small payment (P3(c)).
The researchers grounded their nudge in the extensive literature on framing,
satisfying P4(a).
We believe that potential negative side effects of the nudge on the society at
large were limited or completely prevented by testing the nudge in the designated
and artificial test Mechanical Turk environment, fulfilling checklist item P5(a).
Furthermore, studies on Mechanical Turk can always be terminated and the
incoming survey responses can be monitored (P5(b) and P5(c)).
For the purpose of comparison let us also consider a hypothetical less-than-
ethical nudge trial. Suppose a researcher has developed an application that
would allow her to test how many permissions people are willing to grant when
installing an application. This is carried out in order to help an organisation
called ACME to determine how effective their in-house training has been (they
have instructed employees to be careful about granting permissions). The re-
searcher now designs the installation interface and inserts a number of “nudges”
to urge installation. She could display “9533 ACME employees already use this
app”, exploiting the power of social norms. She could display “Only the first
100 installations are free. Don’t miss out!”, exploiting loss aversion and trigger-
ing an emotional (unthinking) response. These interventions could be classified
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either as simple nudges or prods, depending on the level of control they exert.
It is likely that employees will not be aware of the experiment, or of the
power of the nudge messages since they operate beneath the reflective radar.
Even though all other applications are still available (P1(a)), the majority of
the P1-checklist items are not satisfied.
Furthermore, in this case the nudge would not be deployed “for personal
good”, but “for training assessment”. This would not satisfy P2(a) either. Ad-
vertising the actual purpose of the app would nullify its effectiveness, so the
organization’s employees would probably not be aware of it, thereby not satis-
fying P3(b). Checklist items in P4 are satisfied in this case. The consequences of
the nudge (P5(a)) are likely to be negative: mistrust from employees when they
realize what has happened is very likely. Decisions to install the privacy-invasive
app might well be used by an HR department to sanction the unwary app in-
staller, and the researcher may unwittingly be the tool used to stall someone’s
promising career. This nudge should not be given ethical approval.
9. Limitations
In this paper we have explored the ethical considerations of a variety of
choice architecture interventions ranging from coercive to respectful, and from
those that are transparent to those where the nudgee was a full partner in the
endeavour. We then proposed a set of ethical guidelines to inform researchers
wishing to carry out experiments in information security and privacy. We pro-
pose these not as an end-point, but more as a starting point to launch a discourse
into guidelines for ethical nudging and for supporting processes that need to ap-
prove or decline permission to carry out nudge-related research. There is more
work to be carried out to delineate the applicability of these guidelines in par-
ticular contexts of use, to make them more nuanced and context sensitive and,
in the end, become a truly helpful resource.
10. Conclusion
We started experimenting with nudges in authentication four years ago. Dur-
ing the course of carrying out our experiments we became aware of the fact that
there were no nudge-specific ethical guidelines in place to guide us. We therefore
reviewed the literature to derive these. When we started to peruse the litera-
ture, we realized that we needed first to delineate the nudge concept properly.
Afterwards, we were able to synthesize arguments for, and against, nudging.
We then mapped these onto ethical principles obtained from ethical guidelines
developed for psychological research. We conclude with a set of preliminary
ethical principles formulated to guide nudge Info-S&P researchers.
This paper is not intended to be the final word on the subject; the authors
hope that other Info-S&P researchers will help us to work towards extending and
refining these principles to arrive at a resource that can benefit Ethical Review
Boards and help them to judge proposed Info-S&P nudge-related research.
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Belmont BPS APA
P1. Respect Respect for
Persons
Respect for the auton-
omy, privacy and dig-
nity of individuals and
communities
Respect for
Rights and
Dignity
P2. Beneficence Beneficence Maximizing benefit
and minimising harm
Beneficence and
Nonmaleficence
P3. Justice Justice Justice
P4. Integrity Scientific integrity Fidelity and Re-
sponsibility;
Integrity
P5. Social
Responsibility
Social Responsibility
Table 1: Principles of Ethical Research
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Problem Behavior Example Nudges
Information
Disclosure
Allowing public
access to their
personal informa-
tion social media
websites
Facebook used a simple nudge, a popup di-
nosaur, to let their users know that they had
not updated their privacy settings [140]. They
reported that this led more than three quarters
of their users who saw the dinosaur to complete
their privacy checkup.
The use of defaults is a hidden influencer that
can act as a simple nudge (when privacy pro-
tective) or a prod or sludge (when privacy inva-
sive) [141, 142].
Unwise
Posts
Posting something
to a social me-
dia platform that is
later regretted
Simple nudge: Flickr.com displays photos of
all the people who can see an image someone has
posted, to help people understand the extent of
their sharing [21].
On the other hand, Linked.in displays lists of
‘connections’ when people log in, nudging people
to extend the size of their network. This might
well qualify as a prod because it encourages peo-
ple to include connections they might not even
know.
Awareness Shoulder surfing
attacks on people
drawing cash
Code: Design the architecture so that shoulder
surfing is less likely to be covert [143].
Jarusriboonchai et al. [144] propose a wear-
able device that makes people aware of people
in their proximity who could be observing them
that would qualify as a simple nudge similar
to the intervention used by Flickr.com.
Location
Dislosure
Sharing location
and thereby losing
privacy
Hybrid Nudge: Balebako et al. [21] have been
working on a tool called Locaccino which gives
people more control over when, and with whom,
they share their location. They customize the
tool (requiring reflection) and the way the cus-
tomisation options are framed could be consid-
ered to constitute a simple nudge (e.g. trigger-
ing a sense of privacy preservation: I’m willing to
let my colleagues see my location but only when I
am on company premises and only 9am-5pm on
weekdays)
Passwords Choosing Weak
Passwords/PINs
Hybrid Nudges have attempted to encourage
people to choose stronger passwords by manipu-
lating the choice architecture i.e. the user inter-
face [69, 131, 132, 74, 23, 145]. Gutmann et al.
[146] attempt to nudge people towards choosing
stronger PINs.
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Use
Security
Software
Not installing anti-
virus and firewall
Notice: Grossklags et al. [147] found that pro-
viding more information would impact their de-
cisions to install anti-virus or use firewalls.
Simple Nudge: Raja et al. [148] found that by
leveraging metaphors such as locked doors and
bandits, users made more secure protective deci-
sions.
Security
Updates
Not installing up-
dates
Code: Nag the device owner every day until
they install the update, or install the update un-
less the owner deliberately delays it by pressing
a button.
Notice: Pop up a notification when a new up-
date is available, explaining why it is necessary.
Access
control
Not logging out of
websites
Code: Set the browser to delete cookies auto-
matically after a period of inactivity.
Not using a locking
screen saver
Code: This might well be solved by applying
default settings which lock the screen automati-
cally after 5 minutes of inactivity.
Network
Use
Use insecure WiFi Simple Nudge: Use color and ordering to make
the most secure options the ones that appear first
and are most salient [149]
Website
Use
Not only connect to
HTTPS websites
Simple Nudge: Google now displays a green
tick next to sites with security certificates, to
show which are using HTTPS.
Phishing Clicking on unsafe
links in emails
Notice: TORPEDO pops up a message to in-
form the person of how risky the link is [150].
Liu et al. [151] gathers information from social
networking users to warn people about unsafe
websites.
Installing
Apps
Installing Apps
that compromize
security. Grant-
ing too many
permissions
Hybrid Nudge: Creating a visual representa-
tion of the mobile app’s privacy rating and mak-
ing use of the framing effect made people more
aware of privacy-invasiveness of apps [20].
Mobile
media
Plugging in un-
known media that
people find
Code: Disable all USB ports on a machine to
prevent this.
Table 3: Security & Privacy Behaviours and Mapped Nudges
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Objection Implication Ethical
Principle
Transparency
& Opacity
Where possible, nudges ought to be transpar-
ent [152]
Respect
Unrealistic
Expectations
It is essential for nudgers to be able to justify
and defend their decision to nudge, and their
choice of nudge mechanism (Simple nudge or
Hybrid nudge) to be deployed
Integrity
Concerns
about
Choice
Architects
Nudge designers should have their implemen-
tation plans vetted by an ethical review board
Respect
Mismatched
Nudges
The deployed nudge should be chosen to
match the behavior type that needs to be in-
fluenced.
Integrity
Paternalism Ensure that an investigation is carried out
into good practice to ensure that nudgers are
nudging towards good, according to the latest
knowledge in the deployment context.
Beneficence &
Respect
Autonomy &
Agency
Only nudge when absolutely necessary. Re-
spect the autonomy and judgement of your
fellow human beings.
Respect
Unintended
Side Effects
A proposed nudge should be reviewed by an
independent panel of devil’s advocates whose
task it is to uncover unintended side effects
that could occur. The decision to deploy
should be taken only if the original “good”
is not offset by the potential side effects iden-
tified by this task force.
Justice;
Social
Responsibility
Table 4: Ethical Implications of Objections to Nudges
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